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Abstract
Objectives: Building on what is known about the non-random nature of crime
problems and the explanatory capacity of opportunity theories of crime, this study
explores the utility of using existing university administrative data to detect unusual
patterns of performance consistent with a student having engaged in contract
cheating (paying a third-party to produce unsupervised work on their behalf).
Methods: Results from an Australian university were analysed (N = 3798 results,
N = 1459 students). Performances on unsupervised and supervised assessment items
were converted to percentages and percentage point differences analysed at the
academic discipline-, unit-, and student-level, looking for non-random patterns of
unusually large differences.
Results: Non-random, unusual patterns, consistent with contract cheating, were
found at the academic discipline-, unit-, and student-level, with approximately 2.1%
of students producing multiple unusual patterns.
Conclusions: These findings suggest it may be possible to use existing administrative
data to identify assessment items that provide suitable opportunities for contract
cheating. This approach could be used in conjunction with targeted problem-prevention
strategies (based on situational crime prevention) to reduce the vulnerability of
academic assessment items to contract cheating. This approach is worthy of additional
research as it has the potential to help academic institutions around the world manage
contract cheating; a problem that currently threatens the validity and integrity of
tertiary qualifications.
Keywords: Academic integrity, Contract cheating, Rational choice, Routine activity theory,
Situational crime prevention
Introduction
Contract cheating is a form of academic misconduct that, in some forms, involves
students paying a third-party to produce an unsupervised assessment item that they subse-
quently submit as if it was their own work (Clarke & Lancaster, 2006; Sivasubramaniam,
Kostelidou, & Ramachandran, 2016; Walker & Townley, 2012). As is discussed below,
there is good reason to believe that contract cheating displays patterns that are similar to
those that criminology has typically observed for crime: non-randomness across offenders
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and targets caused by repeat offending and repeat victimization. For over three
decades, routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979) and the rational choice
perspective (Cornish & Clarke, 1986) have combined well to provide an opportunity-
based explanation for the non-random patterns of crime and deviance in other
contexts. This paper makes a novel contribution to the academic integrity area by ex-
ploring the capacity of these criminological theories to account for contract cheating.
This is carried out by exploring the utility of a methodology for identifying repeat tar-
gets and repeat offenders, which assumes students who have engaged in contract
cheating will perform ‘unusually’ better on unsupervised assessment items (such as
take-home essays) relative to supervised assessment items (such as invigilated exams).
By testing a series of difference rules designed to identify ‘unusual’ patterns of differ-
ence, this analysis looks to identify repeat offenders (students with multiple unusual
patterns across units they have taken) and repeat victimisation (with certain units
producing disproportionately large numbers of unusual patterns of difference). This
methodology produces results that are consistent with expectations built on an
opportunity-based account of crime. Given that the opportunity theories of crime
underpin a huge number of successful targeted crime prevention interventions (see
Felson & Clarke, 1998, for a discussion), this exploratory methodology may have
important implications for the prevention and management of the problem of
contract cheating within higher education institutions.
Prevalence and significance of contract cheating
The practice of paying someone else to complete unsupervised academic assessments is
not a new one, as demonstrated, for example, by the headline from the New York Times
on July 10, 1971, suggesting that the, “Market in term papers is booming.” Instead, it is
more likely there have been markets for this type of transaction for as long as there have
been unsupervised assignments in educational institutions. As with all other aspects of
modern day life, recent times have seen a move towards online activity for purchasing
assignments. Despite this, the increased ease of access to potential sources of purchased
assignments may not have necessarily corresponded to an increase in the prevalence of
contract cheating, with estimates from a 10-year study in Australia indicating that
prevalence rates of contract cheating declined slightly from 3.5% in 2004 to 2.8% in 2014
(Curtis & Vardanega, 2016). Alternative estimates have placed contract cheating
prevalence rates close to 1% (Maxwell, Curtis, & Vardanega, 2006) and as high as 7.9%
(Zafarghandi, Khoshroo, & Barkat, 2012). As with all other survey estimates for crime and
deviant behaviour, variations in survey methodologies will have influenced these results
(see Skogan, 1981, for a seminal discussion of these issues). Despite these relatively small
prevalence estimates, the issue of contract cheating still poses a significant problem for
tertiary institutions. In addition to potentially devaluing qualifications and disadvantaging
conscientious students, this practice creates the possibility of unskilled, unqualified con-
tract cheaters using unethically-gained qualifications to secure employment that they are
not capable of undertaking. Further to this, because the product purchased during a con-
tract cheating transaction is intended to be ‘original’, typical methods of plagiarism detec-
tion (such as web-based text pattern matching software) are unlikely to be consistently
effective as an apprehension tools to address this problem.
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Wallace and Newton recently indicated that, “the single greatest need is for more
high-profile research in [the contract cheating] area, to educate educators about the ex-
istence and detail of the problem” (Wallace & Newton, 2014, p. 236). With this in
mind, it is worth exploring whether the patterns that have been consistently demon-
strated across a range of other crime problems hold true for contract cheating. These
patterns include repeat offending, repeat victimisation, and the role that motivation
plays in decisions to exploit an opportunity to offend. If this is the case, it will be a lo-
gical extension to connect this academic misconduct issue to a theoretical platform that
has been demonstrated to help reduce crime problems: the opportunity theories of
crime. The next section outlines the existing evidence to demonstrate this link.
Opportunity and offending: Does what we know about crime problems relate to contract
cheating?
Repeat offending is a consistently demonstrated pattern within criminological research,
whereby a small number of offenders are responsible for a very large amount of crime.
Budd, Sharp, and Mayhew (2005) identified this pattern through a UK-based survey, which
identified that 2% of the self-reported offender sample were responsible for 82% of all re-
ported offences. Chronic repeat offending has also been observed within contract cheating
research. For example, in an analysis of students looking to purchase computer code from
third-parties, Clarke and Lancaster (2006) found that only 8.1% of the 236 identified con-
tract cheaters engaged in this activity on a single occasion, compared to the 2.5% of the of-
fenders who had engaged in this activity between 51 and 200 times in a two-month period.
Curtis and Clare (2017) found that 62.5% of students who reported engaging in contract
cheating across a number of self-report academic misconduct surveys indicated that they
had done so on multiple occasions. Furthermore, in another self-report survey asking
about engaging in contract cheating, Bailey, Tomar, and Chu (2012) reported that 3.7% of
the students surveyed admitted partaking once or twice, while 3.2% admitted contracting
cheating three or more times. Based on existing evidence, therefore, there is good reason
to believe contract cheating involves a group of students who are repeat offenders.
It is also clear from criminological research that crime problems are non-randomly
distributed, clustering across time and space (e.g., Curman, Andresen, & Bratingham,
2015). Crime is also non-randomly distributed with respect to victimisation (e.g.,
Farrell, Phillips, & Pease, 1995) and targets (e.g., Townsley, Homel, & Chaseling, 2003)
with a very small number of targets accounting for a large proportion of victimisation.
For example, Pease and Ignatans (2016) recently demonstrated that 1% of UK house-
holds experienced just under one-quarter of vehicle crimes, almost half of property
crimes, and more than one-third of personal crimes. As with the non-random patterns
of contract cheating offending, Lancaster and Clarke (2012) examined 627 postings on
a commercial site offering ‘writing solutions’ for students and identified non-
randomness with respect to subject area (24.5% of all postings related to ‘Business and
Admin studies’ assignments), level of study (71.0% of postings related to undergraduate
assessments), and country of origin (where 42.3% of postings that could be attribute to
a country had originated from the UK). Thus, there is also evidence of a non-random
distribution of contract cheating across academic disciplines, suggesting that some
unsupervised assessment ‘targets’ are more suitable for this activity than others.
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Given these parallels in empirical findings, and in the absence of academic integrity the-
ory that can explain these non-random patterns, it is important to outline two crimino-
logical theories that combine well to explain similar patterns in a different context. First,
routine activity theory (originally discussed in the seminal work by Cohen & Felson, 1979),
predicts that for a predatory crime to occur a motivated offender must co-occur in time
and space with a suitable target and the absence of a capable guardian. This opportunity
structure is not always present, which explains why offenders do not constantly offend.
Second, the rational choice perspective (first discussed in the seminal work by Cornish &
Clarke, 1986) explains that offenders make crime-specific ‘rational’ choices, ‘bounded’ by
factors such as time, cognitive ability, and available information, and influenced by the per-
ceived costs and benefits of their actions. The rational choice perspective makes the crucial
assumption that crime decisions can be made by anyone, provided they perceive the
reward to outweigh the risk and effort. Together, these theories contribute to an
opportunity-based explanation for crime (see Felson & Clarke, 1998, for a full discussion)
that can account for variations in offending behaviour across contexts, with offenders
acting selectively about where, when, and against whom to offend.
To complete the connection to the opportunity account of offending it is important
to note that contract cheating research also demonstrates the likelihood that offender
motivation is influenced by the perceived risk, rewards, and effort involved with this
decision. In a study by Rigby, Burton, Balcombe, Bateman, and Mulatu (2015), over
50% of students presented with a hypothetical decision-making task indicated they were
willing to cheat on university assessment items if the risk of detection was low. Further-
more, this likelihood increased for students for whom English was a foreign language.
In combination, both of these findings indicate the role of rational decision-making in
the choice to partake in contract cheating. The importance of rational choice and
opportunity has also been demonstrated for academic misconduct more broadly by
Ogilvie and Stewart (2010), who utilized a scenario-based survey of 536 undergraduate
students to demonstrate that the intention to engage in plagiarism was significantly
predicted by (a) the situational perceptions of risk and reward and (b) the individual
decision-maker’s academic self-efficacy. Opportunity theory can explain the in-
consistent nature of deviant behaviour over time in a way that appeals to factors such
as understanding/accepting academic integrity policy, existence of honour codes, and
perceptions of peer behaviour cannot (McCabe & Trevino, 1993).
Aims and expectations of research
To summarize some main points, it seems reasonable to assume that (a) the prevalence
of contract cheating is relatively low (around 3%), (b) repeat offending is likely, (c) some
assessment items provide more suitable targets for contract cheating than others, (d)
opportunity theories of crime problems predict contract cheating will occur in those
situations when a motivated offender coincides with a suitable unsupervised assessment
item, and (e) students who engage in contract cheating will perform ‘unusually’ better
on unsupervised assessment items (such as take-home essays) relative to supervised as-
sessment items (such as invigilated exams). In combination, these findings provide the
platform for the purpose of this paper: to explore whether a methodology can be devel-
oped for identifying repeat targets and repeat offenders. The methodology that is tested,
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below, uses a series of difference rules that examine individual student’s performances
within-units for unsupervised and supervised assessment items.
In combination, the prior research findings and the opportunity theory platform
allow some clear hypotheses for this exploratory analysis. First, looking at the suitable
targets (unsupervised assessment items), it is expected that at the subject area-level and
the unit-level there will be a general non-randomness of these unusual patterns,
produced because some assignments are more suitable for contract cheating than
others (paralleling previous findings relating to repeat victimisation in criminological
literature). Second, looking for motivated offenders, it is anticipated a small percentage
of individual students will produce multiple unusual patterns of performance on
supervised and unsupervised assessment items across units they have taken (paralleling
previous findings relating to repeat offending in criminal contexts).
Data and methodology
Sample
Administrative records from one year of units (sometimes called ‘courses’, ‘classes’,
‘subjects’, or ‘modules’ at Universities) from an Australian Law School were analysed.
This sample contained 3798 unit results from 1459 students (average 2.6 units per
student and a range from 1 unit to 9 units completed by each student). The units were
offered in a few major discipline areas: criminology, law, legal studies, and University
preparatory units. These units were from within the administrative unit of the authors
and so this set of results constituted an opportunity sample to trial this method. This
research was approved by the University’s Human Research Ethics sub-committee.
Data preparation
To align with University assessment policy, units in this sample had between two to
three assessment items. Across-units, the largest components of the marks came from
the combination of an unsupervised assessment item (a report or essay, generally worth
between 40% and 50% of the unit total) and a supervised assessment item (an
invigilated exam, also generally worth between 40% and 50%). To account for the
different weighting of supervised and unsupervised assessment items across units,
students’ performances were converted to percentages. Five difference rules were
generated to identify large, unusual patterns of difference in performance between
unsupervised and supervised assessment items. Given the exploratory nature of this
novel approach to identifying unusual differences there was no research-based
precedent for the researchers to draw on when developing these rules. As a result,
across the five rules, the researchers utilised a mixture of expert opinion from
academics and statistical significance.
When contextualising the first four difference rules, it is important to explain that
within this University certain grade cut-offs influence the grade band that the student’s
performance fell into. Scores of 80% or more were classed as ‘High Distinctions’, scores
between 70% and 79% were classed as ‘Distinctions’, scores between 60% and 69% were
classed as ‘Credits’, scores between 50% and 59% were classed as ‘Passes’, and scores of
less than 50 were graded as ‘Fails’. Building on these grade categories and in consult-
ation with colleagues, the first four difference rules were designed to identify unusual
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combinations of performance within a unit where unsupervised and supervised assess-
ment performance fell into distinctly different grade bands, as follows:
Unusual Pattern 1 (UP1): Unsupervised mark ≥70% and Supervised mark ≤50%.
Unusual Pattern 2 (UP2): (Unsupervised mark – Supervised mark) ≥ 25
percentage points.
Unusual Pattern 3 (UP3): Unsupervised mark ≥80% and (Unsupervised mark –
Supervised mark) ≥ 40 percentage points.
Unusual Pattern 4 (UP4): Unsupervised mark ≥60% and Supervised mark ≤30%.
In order to account for the potential normality of some reduction in performance
between unsupervised assessment items (that students could work on over time and
submit when ready) compared to invigilated exams, the fifth difference rule used drew
on the properties of the difference distribution overall. Across all unit records the mean
and standard deviation of difference between unsupervised and supervised assessment
items was calculated. These values were then used to calculate a one-directional 95%
confidence interval cut-off and individual student difference scores within-units were
compared to this score and significant differences were flagged, as follows:
Unusual Pattern 5 (UP5): Individual [Unsupervised mark – Supervised mark]
difference > one-directional 95% confidence interval Population [Unsupervised mark –
Supervised mark] difference.
The administrative records were manipulated in a way that meant student
performance across all of the units could be examined. Unit codes are anonymized
when presented, below (using unique, but deidentified label names).
Results
Table 1 displays that a ‘normal’ percentage point difference between Unsupervised and
Supervised scores was 4.4 (SD = 14.9). These values generated UP5, above. The overall
frequency for unusual patterns is shown in the bottom of Table 1, indicating that UP2
is the most frequently occurring (8.1% of student results), followed by UP5 (5.0% of
results), UP1 (4.6% of results), and then UP3 and UP4 both occurred less than 1% of the
time. (For interest, the frequency of the inverse of each of these unusual patterns are
included in the bottom line of Table 1). Looking within-academic areas it is clear that
there is initial support for the expectation that there will be a general non-randomness of
unusual difference patterns with some subjects producing more unusual patterns than
Table 1 Number of students, differences between unsupervised and supervised assessment items
(percentage point), and unusual patterns (UP % of students) by academic area
Unsupervised% − supervised%
Academic area N Avg. SD UP1% UP2% UP3% UP4% UP5%
Justice studies (BJU) 354 1.9 14.1 1.7% 4.2% 0.0% 0.0% 1.4%
Criminology (CRM) 641 6.4 17.7 8.4%** 14.5%** 1.7%** 1.9%** 9.7%**
Bachelor Law (LAW) 1282 5.8 14.2 5.5*% 8.5% 0.9% 0.7% 4.7%
Legal studies (LEG) 240 1.1 14.9 3.8% 5.4% 0.4% 0.8% 4.6%
Bachelor Law (LLB) 1161 3.6 14.0 3.0% 6.6% 0.3% 0.3% 4.2%
Master Law (LLM) 120 0.1 13.2 1.7% 2.5% 0.0% 0.0% 1.7%
Total 3798 4.4 14.9 4.6% 8.1% 0.7% 0.7% 5.0%
Inverse rule violation 1.2% 2.6% 0.1% 0.4% 4.9%
Z-proportion indicated significantly larger more frequent relative to the whole sample *p < .05, **p < .01 (Z > 1.64, one-tailed)
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others. The Z-proportion calculations (undertaken manually) indicate that at the
academic area level criminology (CRM) units have a significantly greater frequency
of all five unusual pattern rules and law units had a significantly greater frequency
of UP1.
Drilling down further within academic areas there is also a non-random distribution
of unusual performance at the unit-level (Table 2, which uses the same academic area
codes explained in Table 1 and appends a unique, deidentified capital letter for each
unit). Looking first at criminology units (demonstrated in Table 1 to be generally very
unusual as an academic area relative to the norm), three of the units (CRM_A,
CRM_D, and CRM_G) did not display any unusual patterns and had difference scores
(Unsupervised marks – Supervised marks) that closely aligned with the full dataset. In
contrast, the other five criminology units (CRM_B, CRM_C, CRM_E, CRM_F, and
CRM_H) all displayed significantly more frequent unusual patterns relative to the rest
of unit results in the sample (with differences flagged in the Table). Next, looking at
law units (which appeared to have average difference patterns at the academic area,
Table 1), LAW_E (UP1, UP2, UP3, and UP5) and LAW_J (UP1 and UP2) that displayed
significantly more frequent unusual patterns than expected. Finally, looking within the
Bachelor of Laws (LLB) academic area, which had a very low incidence of unusual
patterns at the academic area level (Table 1), there was still one unit (LLB_J) that
produced a much greater frequency of unusual patterns for UP1 and UP2. There were
seven units (CRM_B, CRM_C, CRM, F, CRM_H, LAW_E, LAW_J, and LLB_J) that
violated at least two of the risk rules at a rate that was significantly greater than
expected. In combination, with respect to the possibility of repeat victimization of
unsupervised assessment items, the findings displayed in Table 1 and Table 2 provide
good support for the expectation of a general non-randomness of unusual difference
score patterns at the subject area level and the unit level.
Next, the difference scores and unusual patterns were analysed at the individual
student level. As explained above, it was anticipated a small percentage of individual
students would produce multiple unusual difference score patterns across units they
took. To test this expectation, the frequency of rule unusual patterns and probability of
multiple occurrences per student are displayed in Fig. 1. Looking first at UP1 [Fig. 1 (a)],
it is clear that the majority of students never produced this difference (89.0%), 9.9% did so
once, and 15 students did so on two or more occasions. The expected rule violation
lambda (λ) = 0.12 with a probability of 2 or more violations p < .01. Similar patterns are
displayed for UP2 (Fig. 1 (b), λ = 0.21, p(≥ 2 violations) < .02), UP3 (Fig. 1 (c), λ = 0.02,
p(≥ 1 violation) < .02), UP4 (Fig. 1 (d), λ = 0.02, p(≥ 1 violations) < .02), and UP5
(Fig. 1 (e), λ = 0.13, p(≥ 2 violations) < .01). It is also clear from Fig. 2 that, as expected,
repeat unusual patterns within an individual were found. The 31 students (2.1% of the
student population analysed here) whose performances are summarized in Fig. 2
produced UP2 at least twice, and this figure shows their overall rate of unusual perform-
ance as a proportion of all units undertaken (captured in the far right column as a per-
centage of unusual units completed). It is clear from this figure that repeated unusual
patterns across units were common for this sample. Students 3, 8, 9, 14, 16, 22, 25, and 31
had unusual patterns of results for all of the units they completed (2 units per student)
and Students 2, 17, 23, and 27 had unusual patterns of results for 3 out of 4 of the units
they completed.
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Table 2 Number of students, differences between unsupervised and supervised assessment items
(percentage point), and unusual patterns (UP % of students) by unit within academic area
Unsupervised% − supervised%
Unit N Avg. SD UP1% UP2% UP3% UP4% UP5%
BJU_A 182 2.2 15.3 2.2% 5.5% 0.0% 0.0% 1.7%
BJU_B 119 2.1 14.7 1.7% 4.2% 0.0% 0.0% 1.7%
BJU_C 53 0.3 5.8 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
CRM_A 146 2.5 13.9 4.1% 6.2% 0.0% 0.0% 2.1%
CRM_B 77 8.0 20.6 13.0%* 19.5%** 5.2%* 0.0% 15.6%**
CRM_C 111 6.9 20.0 10.8%* 22.5%** 0.0% 3.6%* 13.5%**
CRM_D 88 4.4 14.5 4.6% 5.7% 1.1% 0.0% 2.3%
CRM_E 45 6.7 19.3 8.9% 17.8%* 4.4% 0.0% 11.1%
CRM_F 41 21.7 16.3 12.2% 41.5%** 0.0% 17.1%** 36.6%**
CRM_G 65 −0.5 15.4 1.5% 1.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
CRM_H 68 12.1 16.7 17.7%** 19.1%** 5.9%* 1.5% 14.7%**
LAW_A 100 6.0 15.1 8.0% 10.0% 1.0% 3.0% 8.0%
LAW_B 66 3.7 11.6 3.0% 3.0% 1.5% 0.0% 1.5%
LAW_C 24 6.9 19.7 16.7% 12.5% 0.0% 0.0% 8.3%
LAW_D 143 7.9 13.5 4.9% 8.4% 1.4% 0.7% 3.5%
LAW_E 51 19.8 16.3 27.5%** 43.1%** 7.8%* 5.9% 23.5%**
LAW_F 50 5.9 17.9 8.0% 14.0% 0.0% 0.0% 10.0%
LAW_G 60 −6.7 17.9 0.0% 6.7% 0.0% 0.0% 3.3%
LAW_H 59 7.5 12.9 5.1% 6.8% 1.7% 0.0% 6.8%
LAW_I 76 −0.6 14.7 4.0% 2.6% 1.3% 0.0% 1.3%
LAW_J 69 9.5 17.2 13.0%* 20.3%** 0.0% 2.9% 10.1%
LAW_K 70 2.0 12.5 1.4% 2.9% 0.0% 0.0% 1.4%
LAW_L 70 5.9 13.1 5.7% 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.9%
LAW_M 125 8.8 10.1 6.4% 5.6% 0.0% 0.0% 2.4%
LAW_N 59 9.4 5.5 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
LAW_O 81 4.5 12.4 2.5% 7.4% 0.0% 0.0% 2.5%
LAW_P 179 4.6 11.2 0.6% 3.9% 0.6% 0.0% 2.8%
LEG_A 126 4.7 15.4 4.8% 9.5% 0.8% 1.6% 8.7%
LEG_B 106 −3.4 13.1 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
LLB_A 166 −1.3 16.7 1.8% 6.6% 0.0% 0.6% 4.8%
LLB_B 161 1.3 9.8 0.6% 2.5% 0.0% 0.0% 1.9%
LLB_C 172 5.4 13.6 1.2% 6.4% 0.0% 0.0% 4.1%
LLB_D 163 4.3 11.0 1.8% 2.5% 0.0% 0.0% 1.8%
LLB_E 180 10.3 12.1 5.0% 11.1% 0.0% 1.1% 6.1%
LLB_F 40 −4.7 14.3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
LLB_G 26 −15.5 7.7 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
LLB_H 27 −8.9 9.7 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
LLB_I 168 7.3 13.4 6.6% 10.7% 0.6% 0.0% 7.1%
LLB_J 36 11.6 14.6 16.7%* 22.2%* 2.8% 0.0% 13.9%
LLB_K 22 −7.5 12.7 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
LLM_A 37 1.1 14.2 2.7% 5.4% 0.0% 0.0% 5.4%
LLM_B 51 1.8 12.6 2.0% 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
LLM_C 32 −3.8 12.5 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Z-proportion indicated significantly larger more frequent relative to the whole sample *p < .05, **p < .01 (Z > 1.64, one-tailed)
NB. 1 LEG unit was excluded because it had less than 10 students
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Discussion
Implications of these findings
Bearing in mind the potential for Type 1 and Type 2 errors in this case (explored more
fully, below, in the Limitations and Future Directions section), the results of this
exploratory analysis provide clear support for the hypotheses based on prior research
findings relating to contract cheating and an opportunity theory perspective on crime.
Significant area-level and unit-level variation of unusual patterns was observed, which
is consistent with the expectation that some assignments are more suitable targets for
contract cheating. Significant variation was also observed within the student
performances analysed here, with a small percentage of students observed to produce
multiple unusual patterns of performance on supervised and unsupervised assessment
items across units they took (paralleling previous findings relating to repeat offending
for contract cheating, e.g., Curtis & Clare, 2017).
As there is potentially a legitimate need for some of these third-party resources (e.g.,
code writing contractors) and because the provision of these third-party services is not
illegal, prevention targeted at providers of these services does not appear feasible.
Research has demonstrated it is relatively inexpensive to purchase contract cheating
Fig. 1 Frequency of unusual patterns (UP) and probability of multiple violations per student for (a) UP1,
(b) UP2, (c) UP3, (d) UP4, and (e) UP5
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pieces (Clarke & Lancaster, 2013; Sivasubramaniam, Kostelidou, & Ramachandran,
2016), requests for assignments can be completed very quickly and for every contractor
awarded a job, there are an average of 10 others offering to complete it (Wallace &
Newton, 2014). Recent research from Australia has also indicated that purchased
assignments can also be of high quality, with a sample of purchased assignments being
scored marks ranging from 71% to 89% when marked by unsuspecting academics
(Lines, 2016). Given the consistency of contract cheating patterns with those observed
for crime problems, it is worth considering the role that effective crime/problem1
prevention strategies could play in reducing the opportunity for contract cheating.
Fig. 2 Frequency of multiple unusual patterns across 31 students (inclusion criteria: produced UP2 at least
twice) as a percentage of all units completed
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Opportunity reduction as a jumping-off point for targeted prevention of contract
cheating
Translating the offender-target-guardian trifecta from routine activity theory (Cohen &
Felson, 1979) to the issue of contract cheating, these roles are filled by the student
(when motivated to engage in contract cheating) and the unsupervised assessment item
(simultaneously both the time/place and target of the problem). Eck (2003) utilized
routine activity theory to develop the crime (or problem) triangle. The inner layer of
the crime triangle shows how each of the offender-target-guardian roles can be influ-
enced by a controller who has the potential to reduce the opportunity for the problem,
with place managers controlling places, guardians controlling targets, and handlers
controlling offenders (with this third controller relationship first proposed by Felson, as
discussed in Tillyer & Eck, 2011). The outer layer of the crime triangle demonstrates
that controllers can be influenced by super controllers who exert influence on handlers,
managers, and guardians to prevent the underlying problem (Eck & Eck, 2012;
Sampson & Eck, 2008; Sampson, Eck, & Dunham, 2010). Super controllers influence
controllers to make cost-benefit decisions that will reduce the likelihood of problems
occurring. This can occur through ‘formal’, ‘diffuse’, and ‘personal’ mechanisms. In brief,
super controllers can rely on authority provided by (1) organizations, (2) contracts, (3)
financial commitments, (4) regulations, (5) the courts, (6) political institutions, (7) the
markets, (8) the media, (9) groups, and (10) families (see Sampson, Eck, & Dunham,
2010, for a full discussion of this typology).
Figure 3 demonstrates these role relationships with respect to the problem of
contract cheating. This diagram helps demonstrate the potential ‘directions’ for new
pressures that could be applied to reduce the suitability of a specific opportunity for
contract cheating. At the inner-layer of the triangle, the academic integrity policies and
procedures operate in the formal handler role, exerting prevention-focused influence
on potentially motivated offenders. Whilst these procedures are effective when
academic misconduct is detected, this influence is dependent on catching students in the
first instance. As explained above, because contract cheating transactions are intended to
produce ‘original’ output, plagiarism detection pattern matching software is likely to be
ineffective as an apprehension tool for this problem. It is also possible that informal
handlers (such as family and friends of students considering engaging in contract
cheating) are exerting influence over some motivated students at present, but the extent
to which this could be the case is not known. Looking to the other sides of the crime
triangle, the type of assessment item that is set, the content of the unit, and the decisions
made by the unit coordinator in each case will have a direct influence on the opportunity
present within a specific academic unit to engage in contract cheating.
In addition to helping understand why there is non-random variation across units
and students with respect to contract cheating, the crime triangle depicted in Fig. 3 also
provides a starting point for designing targeted interventions to minimize the likelihood
of contract cheating taking place. It is clear from this model that dealing with the
locally-focused opportunity structure of assessment items within problem units is much
more likely to be effective at preventing this problem. Across problem contexts, in part-
nership with the rational choice perspective (Cornish & Clarke, 1986), this framework
helps handlers, guardians, and place managers make rational decisions about when to
intervene to reduce the occurrence of problems as a consequence of the perceived risk,
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reward, effort, excuses, and provocations involved with action. These factors combine
to provide structure for the twenty-five techniques of situational crime prevention
(Cornish & Clarke, 2008), which has been demonstrated to reduce and prevent a huge
range of crime problems (see www.popcenter.org for examples). Recent work by
Hodgkinson, Curtis, MacAlister, and Farrell (2015) has developed a portfolio of tactics
for discouraging academic misconduct that they located within the 25 techniques of
situational crime prevention. Using the methodology for identifying repeat unusual
patterns at the student-, unit-, and discipline-level, it would be possible to use the work
by Hodgkinson and colleagues to design targeted interventions that manipulate the
risk, reward, and effort for students (motivated offenders), adjust the suitability of
unsupervised assessment items (the problem target/place), and make changes at the
unit-level (management and guardianship), targeting the influence of handlers
(informal and formal) and super controllers (including the University, as well as the media
and potentially policies relating to access to websites that promote contract cheating).
This approach has been used very successfully to reduce the opportunity for contract cheat-
ing in a business capstone unit in Australia (Baird & Clare, Removing the opportunity for
contract cheating in business capstones: a crime prevention case study, submitted for review).
Limitations and future directions
As mentioned previously, it is important to discuss some caveats to these conclusions.
First, in the absence of any convictions or confessions from students, it is entirely
Fig. 3 The problem triangle for contract cheating problems, adapted from Sampson et al. (2010)
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possible that this methodology has created a proxy for something other than contract
cheating. In the first instance, Type 1 errors (false positives) may have been produced
by students who are terrible at exams or supervised assessment items that were too
difficult or inappropriate for the unit objectives. If this is the case, then potentially this
approach provides a way for identifying students that need additional educational
support and/or assessment content that needs to be reconsidered and improved.
Alternatively, Type 2 errors might mean that this approach is too arbitrary, and ‘misses’
contract cheaters who do ‘just-well-enough’ on exams to escape the attention of these
risk rules. Given students cannot control the outcome of either assessment item – they
can only control the effort – it is unlikely this would prevent a repeat offender escaping
the attention of these rules when their performance is considered across multiple units.
So while it cannot be concluded that the patterns discussed above are capturing all-
and-only contract cheating, it is definitely the case that this methodology is exposing
non-random problems, which suggests this information provides a jumping-off point
for targeted problem-prevention in a manner that has been demonstrated to work in
other problem contexts. Further to this, information was presented at a Western
Australian contract cheating forum demonstrating individual case studies of contract
cheaters for which large differences were observed between their performance on
supervised and unsupervised assessment items (Jackson, 2016).
Future research should seek to replicate this approach using data from other
universities. The source of this analysis was administrative data that is collected as a by-
product of normal assessment processes, so it is likely that other institutions will be well-
placed to look for patterns within their own existing information. This research team is
already undertaking follow-up analysis of individual student characteristics for those
identified as producing a disproportionate number of unusual performances as well as
looking into the types of assessment items that do (and do not) produce unusual results
at a high rate. In principle, it would be possible to develop targeted intervention strat-
egies that could be trialled to try and reduce the frequency of unusual patterns of
performance that are consistent with contract cheating behaviour. There is also potential
to undertake backwards facing research that uses confirmed cases of contract cheating to
assess past performances for guilty students in other units they have undertaken.
Conclusions
As has been demonstrated across contexts, successful, sustainable problem-
prevention needs to be built on strategies that are targeted, collaborative, multi-
faceted, logistically feasible (with respect to time, cost, and resources), and compatible
with existing policy and legislation (Scott & Goldstein, 2005). The same will be true
for prevention strategies aimed at contract cheating. The overarching commitment
needs to be to implement a strategy designed to reduce the opportunity to contract
cheat. The way this can be achieved will be specific to each situation. Using data to
identify unusual patterns of student performance at the individual- and unit-level
provides one potential avenue for targeted intervention that is definitely worthy of
further investigation. Manipulating the three sides of the problem triangle using the
situational crime prevention techniques means that the success of this approach does
not rely on increased apprehension.
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Endnote
1To draw this parallel is not to comment either way as to whether contract cheating
is criminal.
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